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Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch1
I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent Supreme Court decisions articulate a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration.2 Many decisions mandate speedy removal of arbitral disputes
from the courts." However, whether a district court retains equitable power to
issue an injunction pending arbitration is the subject of conflicting decisions4 and
commentary. 5  The First,6 Second,7 Third,8 Fourth,9 and Seventh 0 Circuits
hold that federal courts have the power to issue injunctions pending arbitration.
The Eighth" and the Tenth" Circuits, however, have determined that courts do
1. 910 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 9 (1984); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
3. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
4. See Merrill Lynch v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052 (4th Cir. 1985) (Congress did not intend
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to strip the judiciary of its equitable powers and does not preclude
a court from granting preliminary injunctive relief); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43,47-51
(1st Cir. 1986) (a district court may grant injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute pending arbitration
provided the prerequisites for traditional injunctive relief are satisfied). But see Merrill Lynch v.
Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (8th Cir. 1984) (where the FAA is applicable and no qualifying
contractual language is alleged, the district court errs in granting injunctive relief); Merrill Lynch v.
Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472, 1478-79 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
5. See Comment, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the FederalArbitration Act: A Perspective
from Contract Law, 54 U. CHn. L. REV. 1373 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Injunctions Pending
Arbitration]; Comment, The Federal Arbitration Act; A Threat to Injunctive Relief, 21 WILLAMETE
L. REV. 674 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, The Federal Arbitration Act]; Note, The United States
Arbitration Act And Preliminary Injunctions: A New Interpretation Of An Old Law, 66 B.U.L. REV.
1041 (1986).
6. Teradyne Inc., 797 F.2d at 47-51.
7. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1054.
8. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1989).
9. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1051-54.
10. Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350-52 (7th Cir. 1983), cerL
denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984).
11. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1292.
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not have the power to issue injunctions unless explicitly provided in the arbitration
agreement. These conflicting decisions underscore the importance of resolving the
questions surrounding the availability of injunctive relief pending arbitration. 13
The federal district court decisions are effectively final because the imminence of
arbitration may sharply limit a party's incentives to appeal an adverse decision. 4
The issue of injunctive relief pending arbitration stems from the language of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 5 which compels arbitration.16 The instant
decision falls within the growing majority of cases holding that the issuance of an
injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration fulfills the court's
obligation under the FAA to enforce a valid agreement to arbitrate. 7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiffs, Blumenthal and Fein, were registered representatives of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) who resigned from Merrill Lynch to join
another firm.18 Over Merrill Lynch's objection, the plaintiffs took customer lists
with them. 9 The NYSE through its constitution and rules mandates "arbitration
of disputes arising out of the employment or termination of employment of a
registered representative with a member firm."20 Blumenthal and Fein filed with
the NYSE for arbitration concerning their continued dealings with clients from
Merrill Lynch. 2' They informed Merrill Lynch of their willingness to arbitrate
on the next available business day, but Merrill Lynch resisted.2
The plaintiffs then sought to compel arbitration under the FAA.23 The
district court ruled the dispute arbitrable, but on a cross motion by Merrill Lynch,
12. Merrill Lynch v. Scott, No. 83-1480, slip op. at I (10th Cir. May 12, 1983). The district court
issued a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that although a stay was mandatory for
the underlying proceeding, the stay pending arbitmtion should not extend to preliminary injunctive
relief because the defendant delayed his arbitration request until after Merrill Lynch sought injunctive
relief. Id. In a one page unpublished summary order the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
grant on injunctive relief. Id. But see Merrill Lynch v. Dutton, 844 F.2d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 1988)
(the court upheld the grant of injunctive relief pending arbitration but prohibited an open-ended
injunction, stating that the injunction should be modified to expire when the issue of preserving the
status quo is presented and considered by the arbitration panel).
13. Merrill Lynch v. McCollum, 469 U.S. 1127, 1130 (1985) (mem. opinion of White, J. and
Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
14. Id.
15. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1-16 (1970 & Supp. 1991).
16. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
17. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1054.
18. Id. at 1051.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 347; New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
Constitution, art. XI § 1).
21. Id. at 1051.
22. Id.
23. Id.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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preliminarily enjoined the plaintiffs from using Merrill Lynch customer records,
soliciting Merrill Lunch clients, or accepting any business from Merrill Lynch
clients.24 In addition, the court ordered Merrill Lynch to post a $100,000
bond."
After a two-day session, the NYSE arbitration panel terminated the
preliminary injunction's effect against the plaintiffs in "a full and final settle-
ment."26 The district court also denied the plaintiff's motion for recovery against
the bond.27 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the district court was without
jurisdiction to enter an injunction pending arbitration, and in the alternative, the
arbitrator's ultimate disposition rendered the injunction substantively wrongful.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the FAA does
not bar a federal district court from issuing a preliminary injunction pending
arbitration, but that when the arbitrators dissolved the injunction, it was rendered
"wrongful," thereby, permitting the plaintiffs to recover on the bond.29
III. BACKGROUND
The FAA does not specifically address whether a court30 may issue a
preliminary injunction pending arbitration. 31  Recent attacks32 on the court's
jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunctions may be divided into three categories:




27. Id. at 1050.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1056.
30. For cases involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions, the Act created a new body
of federal substantive law affecting the interpretation and validity of arbitration agreements. Prima
Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403. According to the Supreme Court, the Act creates a body of federal
substantive law applicable both in state and federal courts. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. Thus,
when a state court is faced with an issue of arbitrability, federal law in terms of the Act governs the
issue under the Supremacy Clause and Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Southland
Corp., 465 U.S. at 10-12. Although the Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to
hone arbitration agreements, it does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. section 1331 or otherwise. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32; Comment, The Federal
Arbitration Act, supra note 5, at 675 n.7. Section 4 of the FAA, providing for an order compelling
arbitration, does not by itself confer federal court jurisdiction. An independent basis is required.
Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1051 n.1.
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
32. See sources cited supra notes 6-12.
33. See sources cited infra notes 46-92.
1991]
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(2) congressional intent and legislative history arguments;' and (3) judicial
precedent and-policy arguments."
A. The Four Threshold Requirements for the Act's Applicability
For the FAA to be applicable, the dispute must related to a maritime
transaction or a "contract evidencing interstate commerce."3' Section one of the
FAA defines "commerce" and "maritime transactions" for purposes of the Act.3
Legislative history suggests that the definitions be interpreted very broadly as
evidenced by statements such as "the control over interstate commerce reaches not
only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods, but also contracts relating
to interstate commerce. "38 The courts followed with an equally expansive
interpretation of "commerce." In Southland Corp. v. Keating,39 the United States
Supreme Court determined that the Act applies to agreements concerning all types
of commerce among individuals of more than one state, subject only to the
employment exception spelled out in the statute.'
Section two of the FAA provides that an arbitration agreement in a contract
involving interstate commerce or a maritime transaction41 "shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract."4 Section two requires the agreement to be
34. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404 (the legislative intent of the Act was to provide
speedy arbitrations which are not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts); Thomson, 574 F.
Supp. at 1478-79; Merrill Lynch v. Shubert, 577 F. Supp. 406, 407 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
35. See cases cited infra notes 130-43.
36. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 1. That Section states:
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of water carriers,
agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or
any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy; would be embraced
within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District
of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any
State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Id.
38. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
39. 465 U.S. 1.
40. Id. at 11; see 9 U.S.C. § 1.
41. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2. That Section states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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in writing,43 but more importantly, it abrogates the common law doctrine that
promises to arbitrate are unenforceable." The legislative history of the Act
reflects congressional intent to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements as
illustrated by the following House Report:
[The common law rule] arises from an anachronism of our American law.
Some centuries ago ... English courts refused to enforce agreements to
arbitrate. Courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment, although they [modern courts] have
frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and injustice
which results from it.45
Under section three of the FAA, if a party to an arbitration agreement brings
an action in court, the opposing party may petition the court to "stay trial of the
action" pending arbitration of the dispute.' The court will stay trial on the
action once it is satisfied that the agreement covers the subject matter of
dispute. 7 As a general rule, the subject matter is determined by the language
and intent of the arbitration agreement.4
Section four of the FAA provides, in relevant part, that "a party aggrieved
by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court .. . for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed." 49 Once the court finds a valid
agreement to arbitrate and that the agreement covers the subject matter of the
dispute, it must determine whether the non-petitioning party breached the
arbitration agreement before it can compel or stay trial of the action under sections
three and four of the FAA.50
43. Merit Ins. v. Leatherby Ins., 581 F.2d 137,142 (7th Cir. 1978) (enforceability of an arbitration
agreement requires a writing).
44. See, e.g., JIuuS HENRY COHEN, LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION 306 (1918).
45. H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 38, at 1-2.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 3. That Section states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which
such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall upon application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the




48. Bedell & Ebling, Equitable Relief in Arbitration: A Survey of American Case Law, 20 LoY.
U. Cm. L. 39, 40 (1988).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
50. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. at 1474.
1991]
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B. The Statutory Arguments
Many attacks on federal court jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunctions
have used section three of the FAA for ammunition.51 Section three states that
on a motion by one of the parties to an agreement, the court shall "stay the trial
of the action" pending arbitration.52 Accordingly, courts have construed the
language to be a mandatory stay of all action and proceedings, including injunctive
relief.53 In Merrill Lynch v. Thomson, 4 the court stated that once a controversy
is determined to be arbitrable under the Act, the court cannot do anything further
on the merits "save compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending
arbitration."53
Merrill Lynch v. Shuberts6 is factually identical to Blumenthal, the instant
case. Merrill Lynch alleged that Shubert, upon resignation, took customer records
and solicited the company's clients." The court denied Merrill Lynch's motion
for a preliminary injunction enjoining Shubert's action based primarily on the
mandatory language of section three of the Act and policy considerations.58 The
court interpreted the mandatory language of the FAA to mean a stay of all judicial
proceedings--injunctive relief included 9 --not simply to "stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the agreement."6
In Merrill Lynch v. Hovey,61 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin five former
employees from soliciting clients and using company records. 2 The Eighth
Circuit refused to grant injunctive relief stating that the language of the Act directs
courts to stay all judicial action.63 The court concluded that injunctive relief,
absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, cannot be granted based upon the
plain meaning of the Act.'
Other courts have interpreted section three of the FAA similarly;' s however,
the growing majority of the courts do not interpret section three as a mandate to
stay all judicial action.' In Merrill Lynch v. Bradley,67 the Fourth Circuit
51. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1289; Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052; Shubert, 577 F. Supp. at 407.
52. See supra note 46.
53. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. at 1474.
54. 574 F. Supp. 1472.
55. d. at 1478.
56. 577 F. Supp. 406.
57. Id. at 406.
58. Id. at 407.
59. Id.
60. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).
61. 726 F.2d 1286.
62. Id. at 1287.
63. Id. at 1291 (emphasis added).
64. ld. at 1292. The court also supported its decision based on congressional intent of the Act.
Id. at 1291.
65. See Thomson, 574 F. Supp. at 1474.
66. See cases cited supra notes 6-10.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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enjoined a former employee from using confidential information in violation of a
non-solicitation clause in his contract.' The court gave "trial of the action" a
more limited interpretation: "Section 3 does not contain a clear command
abrogating the equitable power of district courts to enter preliminary injunctions
to preserve the status quo pending arbitration."" The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that in section three the word "trial" should not be given any other meaningthan
its "common and ordinary usage."70 Thus, "trial of the action" does not include
preliminary injunctions.1
In Merrill Lynch v. McCollum,72 Justice White cited a 1951 opinion in his
dissent memorandum on the denial of certiorari.73 Justice White referred to an
opinion written by Judge Weinfield stating that the power to issue a preliminary
injunction pending arbitration follows from the court's power to compel
arbitration:
It would be an oddity in the law if the Court, after compelling a party to live
up to his undertaking to arbitrate, had to stand idly by during the pendency
of the arbitration which it has just directed and permit him to assert his 'right
to breach a contract and to substitute payment of damages for nonperfor-
mance.'
7 4
Another statutory argument is based on the language of section four of the
FAA. 75 That section provides that a party seeking to compel arbitration pursuant
to a valid written agreement "may petition any United States district court which,
save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction" over the subject matter of the
case for an order to arbitrate according to the agreement. 6 In Blumenthal, the
former employees contended that they were wrongfully enjoined from soliciting
clients pending arbitration." Blumenthal asserted that the language "save for
such agreement" operates to divest the court of jurisdiction over a dispute covered
by an arbitration agreement except to order arbitration or other powers explicitly
provided for in the FAA. 78 The court rejected this interpretation of section four
as being inconsistent with judicial precedent and congressional intent.7
67. 756 F.2d 1048.
68. Id. at 1049.
69. d. at 1052.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 469 U.S. 1127.
73. Id. at 1130.
74. Albatross S.S. Co. v. Manning Bros., 95 F. Supp. 459, 463 (5.D.N.Y. 1920) (quoting O.W.
HoLdEs, COLLECTED LEGAL. PAPERS 167, 175 (1951)).
75. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1049-50.
78. Id. at 1052.
79. Id. at 1054.
1991]
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The argument has been made that the very language of section four
authorizes the court to issue injunctive relief.so Section four allows the court to
"order... [the parties] to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement."8 1 One commentator cites Judge Newman's decision in Guinness-
Harp Corp. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.Y in support of this statutory construc-
tion.3 Judge Newman argued that because a federal court is eutitled to
adjudicate issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate and "maintenance of the status quo pending arbitration relates in a
substantial way to the performance of the agreement," the court must be able to
issue injunctive relief.8 Judge Newman stated that "an injunction to enforce the
status quo provision is available whether this provision is regarded either as part
of the obligation to arbitrate subject to the federal arbitration law, or as a condition
precedent to, or consideration for arbitration subject to federal arbitration law."'
Enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA was intended, inter
alia, to elevate the agreements to an enforceable contract status." The House
Report states that an arbitration agreement is to be "upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs."8 Therefore, enforceability of arbitration agreements
is rooted in contract law, and the courts are understandably reluctant to act when
the parties have selected arbitration as their forum of relief." However, the
Blumenthal court rejected the argument that section four divests the judiciary of
all equitable powers." "The fact that the statute posits a situation where the
district court would have jurisdiction in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate
does not preclude us from holding that a court retains sufficient jurisdiction to
issue an injunction pending arbitration when such an agreement is present. "' °
Similarly, the court in Merrill Lynch v. Bradley refused to hold that the FAA
abrogated all equitable powers of the judiciary, saying "[w]e do not believe that
Congress would have enacted a statute intended to have the sweeping effect of
stripping the federal judiciary of its equitable powers in all arbitrable commercial
disputes without undertaking a comprehensive discussion and evaluation of the
statute's effect."91 The court's reasoning is supported by a multitude of case law
80. See sources cited supra note 5.
81. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
82. 613 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. See Comment, Injunctions Pending Arbitration, supra note 5, at 1394.
84. Guinness-Harp, 613 F.2d at 472 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 473.
86. H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 38, at 1.
87. Id
88. See Provisional Remedies, Disclosure andArbitration (June 15, 1975), reprinted in LAwYER's
ARBITRATION LzErERS 1970-79, at 76 (1981).
89. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1053.
90. 1
91. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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concerning congressional authority to abridge the equity jurisdiction of the
courts.
2
C. The Congressional Purpose and Legislative Intent Arguments
In Merrill Lynch v. Hovey, the Eighth Circuit held that issuance of injunctive
relief in a controversy that is arbitrable abrogates the intent of the FAA and,
therefore, is an abuse of discretion.93 The dispute in Hovey arose when former
employees used the firm's records to solicit clients." The court stated that the
congressional intent revealed in the FAA is to facilitate quick, expeditious
arbitration."
Additionally, the court stated that the judicial inquiry requisite to determine the
propriety of injunctive relief necessarily would inject the courts into the merits of
issues more appropriately left to the arbitrator.9 The court concluded there was
compelling authority to hold that "where the Arbitration Act is applicable and no
qualifying contractual language has been alleged, the district court errs in granting
injunctive relief."97
Other courts, however, interpret the legislative intent differently than the
Eighth Circuit. In Teradyne, Inc. v. Mosteck Corp.,98 the court concluded that
the authorities cited by the Eighth Circuit in Hovey were not so compelling."
The cases"0 relied upon by the court in Hovey manifest a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration of disputes; however, none of these cases specifically
addressed the power of a federal court to issue an injunction pending arbitra-
tion.10 1 Furthermore, the legislative intent of the FAA, articulated by the Eighth
Circuit, to "facilitate quick expeditious arbitration"1" is compatible with the
availability of injunctive relief to preserve the meaningfulness of the arbitration
process.
103
In addition, the Eighth Circuit's reliance on Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co.'" might be outdated. A more recent
92. See sources cited infra notes 120-29.
93. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1291. However, the court did intimate that injunctive relief would be
available if the arbitration agreement itself contained injunctive relief provisions. Id.
94. 1d. at 1286.
95. Id. at 1291 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 1).
96. Id, at 1292 (relying on Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 395).
97. Id.
98. 797 F.2d 43.
99. Id. at 48-S1.
100. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1292 (relying on Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. 395; Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steel Workers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1).
101. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1053.
102. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1291 (relying on Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 1).
103. Teradyne Inc., 797 F.2d at 51.
104. 460 U.S. 1.
1991)
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Supreme Court decision, Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,105 distinctively alters
earlier pronouncements on the intent of the Act." The Supreme Court rejected
the former position that the overriding objective of the FAA was to facilitate
quick, expeditious arbitration.107 The Court stated:
The legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose behind its
passage was to ensure the judicial enforcement of privately made agreements
to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims. The
.Act, after all, does not mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the
enforcement-upon the motion of one of the parties-of privately negotiated
arbitration agreements."
The Supreme Court continued by stating that the passage of the Act was motivated
"first and foremost" by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which
parties had entered.' °9
Additionally, the Court determined that when faced with the competing
interests of full enforcement of an arbitration agreement and quick and expeditious
arbitration, the courts are required to "enforce the bargain of the parties."110 If
the Act's goal is to give arbitration agreements full enforcement, then injunctive
relief should be available to preserve the status quo. One district court concluded:
The Arbitration Act would serve little social purpose if the invocation of the
arbitration process meant potential damages would be left to mount up as the
administrative process spent its course, or that the tactical posturing of the
disputants could continue with a life of its own outside the arbitration
framework which both sides bargained for."'
Accordingly, the Dean Witter decision rebuts the proposition that expeditious
dispute resolution precludes provisional remedies."
12
Aside from Congress' motivation for passing the FAA, the question is
whether Congress intended to curtail the equitable powers of the judiciary in a
dispute pending arbitration. The power to issue a preliminary injunction, an in
personam order, historically developed in the Court of Chancery in England." 3
The English dichotomy between courts of law and equity were merged together
105. 470 U.S. 213.
106. Note, supra note 5, at 1054.
107. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 219.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 220.
110. Id. at 221.
111. Speedee Oil Change Sys. v. State St. Capital, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 289, 292 (E.D. La. 1989).
112. Note, supra note 5, at 1055.
113. See, e.g., D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDiEs 106-07 (1973).
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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in the American judicial system by the Field Code of 1848114 and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938." s
The preliminary injunction developed as an emergency measure before a full
hearing could be held.116 There is no right to discovery and the hearing is not
on the merits.117 Because the hearing is inadequate in scope and given on short
notice in most situations, the party seeking the injunction must post a bond as
security in case the opposing party is wrongfully enjoined.11 s The courts
typically consider several factors when determining whether to grant an injunction:
(1) risk of irreparable harm; (2) adequacy of the legal remedy; (3) balancing of the
hardships; (4) likelihood of success on the merits; and (5) public interest. 19
Clearly, Congress does have the power to restrict the exercise of the court's
discretion and its equitable powers.12o However, in determining whether
Congress intended to abridge the equitable powers of the judiciary, the intent must
be clear and unequivocal. 2 Congressional intent will not be lightly ap-
plied. 22 The judiciary's equitable powers are not to be restricted without a
"clear and valid legislative command."1" In terms of the FAA, there is nothing
in the legislative history concerning injunctions or other pre-trial provisions. As
the court in Teradyne, Inc. rightfully concluded, the FAA contains no express ban
on provisional remedies. 4 The complete absence of intent in the House and
Senate Reports to divest judicial equitable powers strongly suggests there was no
intent to do so. 1 25
In Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,"12 the Supreme Court
established that a grant of equitable power to enforce a statute should be construed
broadly in light of statutory purposes.12 7 As the Supreme Court stated in Dean
Witter, the purpose of the FAA is to give full judicial enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate.' 28 The congressional intent to enforce arbitration agreements could
114. With the exception of Maryland, Arkansas, Tennessee and Delaware.
115. R. LEAV L, J. LovE, G. NFLSON, EQUITABLE REMmmttEs REsTrnmoN AND DAMAGEs 8 (4th
ed. 1986).
116. D. DOBBS, supra note 113, at 106-07.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 106-07.
119. Id.
120. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). 'Congress may intervene and
guide or control the exercise of the court's discretion [to issue injunctions] but we do not lightly
assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles." Id.
121. Id.
122. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052. "Section 3 (of the FAA] states only that the court shall stay the
trial of the action; it does mention preliminary injunctions or other pre-trial proceedings. Certainly
Congress knows how to draft a statute which addresses all actions within the judicial power." Id.
123. Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
124. Teradyne, Inc., 797 F.2d at 51.
125. Note, supra note 5, at 1053.
126. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
127. Id. at 291.
128. ean Witer, 470 U.S. at 213.
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be thwarted if the court were precluded from issuing preliminary injunctions to
preserve the status quo. Without the protection of a preliminary injunction, the
arbitration process would be rendered a hollow formality in many situations."8
For example, if the opposing party irredeemably alters the status quo, then the
party seeking arbitration will be left a right without a remedy.
D. The Judicial Policy and Precedents Arguments
In Merrill Lynch v. Thomson,' 30 the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri held that a federal court's grant of preliminary injunctive
relief would be inefficient, resulting in unnecessary duplication between the
arbitrators and the courts.1 3 ' The court stated that the "parties should direct their
efforts toward presenting the merits of their dispute to the arbitrator rather than
diverting their energies and resources to prosecuting and defending a preliminary
injunction motion in district court." 32 Although this argument has some merit,
inefficient duplication is not necessarily the obvious result. First, a preliminary
injunction hearing is not on the merits.1 33 In fact, it is inappropriate for a court
to give a final judgment on the merits at the preliminary stage 2 ' The petition-
ing party's likelihood of success on the merits is only a factor in the court's
determination: it is not case dispositive.135  Irreparable injury is also a
prerequisite for injunctive relief."6 However, if arbitration is imminent, the
chance of irreparable harm is greatly diminished. Second, in a traditional
preliminary injunction hearing, the court issues the injunction pending its own final
determination on the merits.137 With an injunction pending arbitration, the
process is less duplicative than the traditional process because the arbitrators, not
the court, make a final determination on the merits.
The court in Thomson stated that injunctive relief was inappropriate because
there was an adequate remedy at law." 8 "The law gives Merrill Lynch the very
remedy for which it contracted: arbitration under the arbitration rules of the New
York Stock Exchange. " 139 Again, this reasoning is misplaced because arbitration
is not a "remedy" but a contractual agreement. The very fact that arbitration is
based on contract principles limits its applicability to the subject matter of the
agreement. Frequently, arbitration agreements do not have provisions for
injunctive relief. The power of arbitrators to grant equitable, provisional or
129. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053.
130. 574 F. Supp. 1472.
131. Id. at 1479.
132. Id.
133. See D. DOBBS, supra note 113, at 106.
134. University of Tex. v. Camcnisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
135. Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1984).
136. d. at 386.
137. Id. at 389.
138. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. at 1478.
139. Id. at 1479.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
12
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1991, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1991/iss2/7
INJUNCTIONS PENDING ARBITRATION
extraordinary remedies in a contractual dispute derives from the language of the
arbitration agreement. 14° Furthermore, even if the arbitration agreement provides
for equitable remedies, a judicial preliminary injunction may be necessary to
preserve the status quo so that the arbitration is not a hollow formality.""1
The damage has already been done if one party may irreversibly alter the
status quo, rendering the arbitration process which the parties bargained for
meaningless. If the court determines that the arbitrator has the power to resolve
the dispute before the alteration of the status quo, then under traditional
preliminary injunction analysis the injunction should not be granted because there
would be an adequate remedy at law or lack of irreparable harm.
Finally, the court in Thomson stated that if injunctive relief were granted,
every recalcitrant party to a dispute will file a motion for preliminary injunctive
relief in an attempt to delay arbitration. 42 The court's pessimistic perception
of lawyering antics can be remedied quickly by the court itself. If arbitration is
close at hand, then perhaps there is an adequate remedy at law and the chances for
irreparable injury are drastically reduced; therefore, the motion for injunctive relief
should be denied. There is also no basis for arbitration to be stayed pending the
outcome of a preliminary injunction adjudication. One of the fundamental
prerequisites for a preliminary injunction is the finding of irreparable injury before
an arbitrator is able to make a determination on the merits. 43 If the motion is
simply a delay tactic, it should be dismissed if there is no cause of action.
Additionally, there is no more risk of delay tactics in a normal injunction
proceeding than in an situation of an injunction pending arbitration.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Blumenthal, the court rejected the plaintiff's statutory argument that the
language of section 4 of the FAA strips the judiciary of all equitable jurisdiction
over a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement.144 The court pointed out
decisions which gave explicit and broad recognition to a district court's power to
grant a preliminary injunction pending arbitration. 45 One such decision was
Roso-Lino Beverage Distributors v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,' 46 in which the
court stated:
We reverse the denial of the preliminary injunction because it appears,
from the record before us, that the district court believed its decision to
refer the dispute to arbitration stripped the court of power to grant
140. BedeU & Ebling, supra note 48, at 41-42.
141. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053.
142. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. at 1479.
143. Roland Machinery, 749 F.2d at 386.
144. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1052.
145. Id.
146. 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984).
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injunctive relief. The fact that a dispute is to be arbitrated, however,
does not absolve the court of its obligation to consider the merits of a
requested preliminary injunction.147
The Blumenthal court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that a district
court's injunction pending arbitration abrogates the agreed-upon role of the
arbitrators as adjudicators of the dispute and the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration of disputes.1 The court reasoned that pro-arbitration policies are
furthered, not weakened, by permitting the court "to preserve the meaningfulness
of arbitration through a preliminary injunction." 49 The court stated that
"issuance of an injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration fulfills the
court's obligation under the FAA to enforce a valid agreement to arbitrate."50
Although the court denied the plaintiff's recovery for damages on the bond
under the lack of jurisdiction argument, it allowed recovery based on the
wrongfulness of the injunction."1 The court stated that a party has been
wrongfully enjoined under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65(c) if it is found
that the enjoined party had always had the right to do the enjoined act." 2 The
focus is on whether, in hindsight, and in light of the ultimate decision on the
merits, the injunction should not have been issued in the first instance. In
Blumenthal, the arbitrators determined that Merrill Lynch was not entitled to an
injunction and that Blumenthal had at all times the right to do business with the
Merrill Lynch client.5 3 Finally, because the claim for liability on the bond
could not arise except upon a favorable ruling to Blumenthal, it is not barred by
claim preclusion. A motion for wrongful injunction under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 65(c) is a separate and distinct claim from the merits underlying the
controversy.1 '
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is a contractual process; therefore, problems relating to provisional
relief and various remedies may be avoided by good draftsmanship. Although
practitioners may and should use unequivocal language in arbitration agreements
that addresses preliminary injunctive relief pending arbitration, the courts should
not construe broad arbitration clauses to preclude the judiciary of equitable
jurisdiction. Denying judicial injunctive relief is inconsistent with congressional
intent. The FAA was enacted to ensure that arbitration agreements be given full
147. Id. at 125; Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1052.
148. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1052.
149. Id. at 1053.
150. Id. at 1054.
151. Id. at 1056.
152. Id. at 1054.
153. Id. at 1055.
154. Id. at 1056.
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effect. If the courts are not vested with the power to issue preliminary injunctive
relief pending arbitration, then in some situations the entire spirit of the Act is
crushed. A party should not be allowed to irredeemably alter the status quo in
such a manner that would render the arbitrator's ultimate decision meaningless.
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